A PRELIMINARY draft of the revised ethical code for Catholic hospitals contained this statement: "The failure to supply the ordinary means of preserving life is equivalent to euthanasia/' When this draft of the code was submitted to a group of theologians for criticism, they were asked whether this general statement should be made more particular by the addition of a note specifying what means should be considered ordinary and what extraordinary. To this question one theologian replied: "I don't believe in being more specific on points like this because you will immediately get into the field of mere opinion, not binding on anyone. Leave something to the doctor's conscience. After all, it is about as good as anything we have to offer on this point." There was general agreement with this criticism; hence the published revision of the code contained only the general statement.
PRELIMINARY draft of the revised ethical code for Catholic hospitals contained this statement: "The failure to supply the ordinary means of preserving life is equivalent to euthanasia/' When this draft of the code was submitted to a group of theologians for criticism, they were asked whether this general statement should be made more particular by the addition of a note specifying what means should be considered ordinary and what extraordinary. To this question one theologian replied: "I don't believe in being more specific on points like this because you will immediately get into the field of mere opinion, not binding on anyone. Leave something to the doctor's conscience. After all, it is about as good as anything we have to offer on this point." There was general agreement with this criticism; hence the published revision of the code contained only the general statement. 1 One can hardly question the prudence of the decision concerning the code. Yet a problem does exist which calls for solution. Our age abounds in artificial means of preserving life: e.g., incubators, blood transfusions, oxygen tents and masks, iron lungs, highly technical operations, insulin, and various other stimulants and medications. The formulation of some definite rules concerning the duty of using these artificial means is not merely intriguing speculation; it is also-if I may judge from the many questions asked me-a practical necessity. For two or three years I have been gathering material on this problem and attempting to solve pertinent questions. The results of my study are not yet satisfying. However, it seemed to me that if I could present a survey of the literature I have read, together with my own criticisms and conclusions, it might serve as the basis for a constructive discussion.
My plan includes four divisions. I shall first present a digest of per-tinent material taken from the standard moralists, then a number of points taken from more specialized recent works. These two sections will be merely factual, that is, a reporting of what I have found. The third section will contain a discussion of certain questions that need to be answered before rules of obligation can be accurately formulated; and the last section will offer a brief analysis of a few practical cases.
STANDARD MORALISTS
The solution of many problems concerning the duty of preserving life undoubtedly depends on a prudent communis aestimatio of the factors involved in the problems. My purpose, therefore, in studying standard authors was to consult a sufficient number of representative moralists to manifest common estimates, as well as to reveal any serious differences of opinion. I think I can safely say that the works included in my survey were adequate for this purpose.
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Speaking of the means of preserving life and of preventing or curing disease, moralists commonly distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary means. They do not always define these terms, but a careful examination of their words and examples reveals substantial agreement on the concepts. By ordinary they mean such things as can be obtained and used without great difficulty. By extraordinary they mean everything which involves excessive difficulty by reason of physical pain, repugnance, expense, and so forth. In other words, an extraordinary means is one which prudent men would consider at least morally impossible with reference to the duty of preserving one's life.
Many authors give no examples of ordinary means. Those who do, however, rather consistently suggest such things as these: the use of reasonably available food, drink, medicines, and medical care; the wearing of sufficient clothing; the taking of necessary recreation; and so forth. Illustrations of extraordinary means are more frequently given, but most authors are content with a very brief and incomplete enumeration. Examples most often cited are the following: leaving one's 2 1 do not recall all the works consulted. Most moralists say very little about the subject. I have some notes, mostly brief jottings, from the following: St. Alphonsus, AertnysDamen, Arregui, Ballerini-Palmieri, Busenbaum, De Lugo, Genicot-Salsmans, Gury, Iorio, Jone-Adelman, La Croix, Laymann, Marc-Gestermann-Raus, Merkelbach, NoldinSchmitt, Prummer, Ubach, Vermeersch, and Wouters.
home to go to a more healthful climate; 3 the maiden's repugnance to being treated by a (male) physician or surgeon; the amputation of a limb; other major operations, especially those involving the opening of the abdomen; and all very costly treatments.
Older authors considered major operations to be extraordinary means partly because of the danger and mainly, it seems, because of the excruciating pain of pre-anesthetic days. Explaining their opinion with reference to amputations, Palmieri wrote: "Theologians are speaking of the intense pains of amputation. But what if the use of an anesthetic removes the pain? Could we not still say that the serious inconvenience of living with a mutilated body would just as readily excuse the patient from undergoing the amputation as would the very intense pains that last only a short time?" 4 Anesthetics have removed the pain of operations and amputations; surgical skill and methods of controlling hemorrhage and infection have greatly decreased the danger; and artificial limbs have to some extent diminished the inconvenience following upon amputations. For these reasons there is a tendency among modern authors to consider most major operations and amputations as ordinary means. However, some of these authors readily admit the possibility of a subjective repugnance which would make the operations extraordinary means for certain individuals.
5 Also, some authors show an inclination to question the certainty of success of major operations. 6 Finally, there are not wanting excellent authorities, whose works have been rather recently edited, who still list major operations and amputations as extraordinary means without making any special qualifications.
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Is the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary purely relative, or is there an absolute norm beyond which a means must be considered as extraordinary for everyone? Perhaps this aspect of the question calls for more study than I have given it. My general impression is that there is common agreement that a relative estimate suffices. In other words, if any individual would experience the inconvenience sufficient to constitute a moral impossibility in the use of any means, that means would be extraordinary for him. But is the relative inconvenience always required? Some authors clearly deny this. For instance, they say that even a wealthy man need not spend a large sum of money or obtain the best doctors.
8 Ubach explains this by saying that such means are beyond the reach of most men and that they exceed "common diligence."
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What principles govern the use of the various means of preserving life? Before I give the moralists' answer to this question, I should like to note that, according to my survey, they consider this duty only with reference to the individual. They say nothing about the duties of relatives or of the medical profession.
As regards the individual's duty, the following are commonly accepted principles: Per se he is obliged to use the ordinary means of preserving his life. Per se he is not obliged to use extraordinary means, though the use of such means is permissible and generally commendable. Per accidens, however, he is obliged to use even extraordinary means, if the preservation of his life is required for some greater good such as his own spiritual welfare or the common good. All these principles are based on solid reasons. The duty of preserving life would be chimerical if it did not include the necessity of using ordinary means, and the neglect of such means is tantamount to suicide-except, of 7 Jone-Adelman (1945), n. 210; Aertnys-Damen, I (1944) course, when it involves a justifiable application of the principle of the double effect. This precept, however, is an affirmative precept, and it is subject to the usual limitations of such precepts; it does not extend to what is morally impossible. Hence, the use of extraordinary means is not included in the precept. But since even heroic measures are obligatory when necessary for one's own salvation or for the common good, there can be occasions when extraordinary means are obligatory. And even when they are not strictly obligatory they are often of great value for gaining merit, atoning for sin, giving good example to others, and so forth; hence their use is not only permissible but frequently laudable.
I have already mentioned the fact that some authors are inclined to say that a major operation is not obligatory because it is dangerous or not certain of success. These authors are discussing a borderline case; it is not clear whether they consider the operation an ordinary or an extraordinary means. Some authors, however, very frankly apply a similar principle to the use of clearly ordinary means. For instance, having outlined the duty of using ordinary means, Jone-Adelman add, "It is understood . .. that there be a well-founded hope that medicinal remedies will be helpful."
10 With reference to such ordinary means as calling a doctor and using available medicines, Noldin-Schmitt declare that a sick man would sin by failing to use such means "ubi spes affulget convalescendi."
11 And long before these two authors, Sanchez wrote that a person in danger of death may not refuse medicines "si sit spes salutis."
12 Busenbaum incorporated Sanchez' statement into his text, 13 and thus it has been repeated, with apparent approval by the great Busenbaum commentators, La Croix, 14 St. Alphonsus, 15 and Ballerini-Palmieri.
16 By implication at least, these authorities seem to hold that no remedy is obligatory unless it offers a reasonable hope of checking or curing a disease. I would not call this a common opinion because many authors do not refer to it. But I know of no one who opposes it, and it seems to have intrinsic merit as an application of the axiom, nemo ad inutile tenetur. Moreover, it squares with the rule com-monly applied to the analogous case of helping one's neighbor: one is not obliged to offer help unless there is a reasonable assurance that it will be efficacious.
My final point in this section concerns two cases discussed by De Lugo.
17 His first case refers to a man who has been unjustly condemned to starvation. If this man's friends bring him food is he obliged to eat it? The Cardinal's answer is that if the man can get food regularly and thus ward off death, he is obliged to eat; but he is not obliged to eat if he knows that he can get food only once or twice. Another of his examples concerns a man who is about to be burned to death by his enemies. Suppose this man has a few buckets of water and can put out the fire, is he obliged to do so? De Lugo replies with the same distinction: if he can thus prevent his death, he is obliged to use the available water; but if the use of the water would simply delay the inevitable he is not bound to use it. In explaining his solutions De Lugo admits that the cases deal with ordinary means, but he applies to them the principle, parum pro nihilo reputatur. "The duty of preserving one's life through ordinary means," he says, "does not include the duty of using means that will prolong life so briefly that they may be morally considered as nothing."
It may be that the principle, parum pro nihilo reputatur, is really contained in the preceding principle, nemo ad inutile tenetur. Yet there seems to be a slight difference. Furthermore, De Lugo applies his principle even to the taking of food, which is a purely natural means of preserving life, whereas the other authors were speaking only of remedies for illness.
SPECIALIZED WORKS
As I mentioned previously, the standard moral treatises apparently do not discuss the duties of relatives and doctors. And even recentlyedited manuals say nothing about the use of most of our modern artificial means of preserving life. Some of these points have been covered by more specialized works of the last decade or so; and it seems advisable to note these before initiating a critical discussion.
In 1941, J. McCarthy discussed an interesting case concerning the use of insulin.
18 A diabetic patient who had been using insulin for some time developed an inoperable and very painful type of cancer. By ceasing to use the insulin the patient would quickly lapse into a diabetic coma and die an easy death; by continuing to use the insulin she would prolong her life, racked with pain by the cancer, until the latter disease finally brought death. (The case stated that she might live about six months.) Before solving the case Fr. McCarthy pointed out that, even if the use of insulin should be considered an extraordinary means, it would not be permissible for the patient, in ceasing to use the insulin, to "intend the shortening of her life as the immediate object of her act." He also insisted that the duty of using the insulin must be considered independently of the cancer. With these preludes, his solution was that with reference to the control of diabetes insulin must be considered an ordinary means of preserving life and therefore obligatory, despite the fact that the cancer would make life very painful. He admitted the possibility of considering insulin an extraordinary means only if it should become too expensive 19 or if the taking of it would in itself become excessively painful.
Commenting on Fr. McCarthy's solution, John C. Ford, S.J., remarked: "The argumentation is carefully and clearly proposed. The conclusion may seem harsh to the tender-hearted, and perhaps some might argue plausibly that the use of insulin is in itself an extraordinary means of preserving life. In any event, the moralist cannot desert his principles in order to arrive at the easier solution." 20 To Joseph P. Donovan, CM., a correspondent referred this case: "Patients with a mortal illness oftentimes are unable to take food in the normal manner. Nourishment is then given to them intravenously. Frequently they linger for weeks, their only food being intravenous injections." 21 The correspondent asked whether the intravenous feeding should be considered an extraordinary means of preserving life and consequently whether a doctor might licitly request that the injections be discontinued. The correspondent himself had answered both questions in the affirmative. Fr. Donovan's reply was a decided nega-tive. Intravenous feeding, he said, involves no impossibility, either physical or moral; hence it must be considered an ordinary means, and the stopping of the injections would be a form of mercy killing.
Another case on intravenous feeding is contained in Joseph V. Sullivan's dissertation, Catholic Teaching on the Morality of Euthanasia. 22 Since this work may not be available to many readers, I shall quote the case and solution in full:
A cancer patient is in extreme pain and his system has gradually established what physicians call "toleration" of any drug, so that even increased doses give only brief respites from the ever-recurring pain. The attending physician knows that the disease is incurable and that the person is slowly dying, but because of a good heart, it is possible that this agony will continue for several weeks. The physician then remembers that there is one thing he can do to end the suffering. He can cut off intravenous feeding and the patient will surely die. He does this and before the next day the patient is dead.
The case involves the principle that an ordinary means of prolonging life and an extraordinary means are relative to the patient's physical condition. Intravenous feeding is an artificial means of prolonging life and therefore one may be more liberal in application of principle. Since this cancer patient is beyond all hope of recovery and suffering extreme pain, intravenous feeding should be considered an extraordinary means of prolonging life. The physician was justified in stopping the intravenous feeding. He should make sure first, however, that the patient is spiritually prepared.
With reference to the use of stimulants to prolong life, Charles A. McFadden, O.S.A., proposes this problem for discussion:
A patient is dying in great pain. Death is certain and inevitable. A certain stimulating drug may prolong life for another hour or two. Members of the patient's family tell the doctor and nurse that the patient has suffered enough already and request that the drug not be given.
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Fr. McFadden's own comments on this problem are extremely guarded. He begins by assuming that "death is certain and inevitable within an hour or so," and that "the patient has made his peace with God and received the Last Sacraments. of the drug is not obligatory, first, because in the given conditions it may be considered an extraordinary means, and secondly because "no one is obliged to submit to such grave hardship in order to fulfill a duty, that is, to take such a step to prolong life for such a brief period." To this solution he adds the warning: "One must not be too ready to believe that death is certain and inevitable; and, if a dying person has not yet received the Last Sacraments, every effort should be made to keep him alive until he has had the opportunity to do so." 24 La Rochelle-Fink also discuss the duty of prolonging life by the use of such stimulants as caffeine, serum, oxygen, and camphorated oil.
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They first cite two opinions: one by Dr. Bon, who argues that these things should be used because the last hours of life are very precious and the doctor's duty is to cure; the other by Boigelot, who holds that these things are extraordinary measures and generally not obligatory. La Rochelle-Fink follow the middle course. They believe that the doctor must try to estimate what line of action would be productive of the greater good. Explaining this point, they write:
It may be useful at times to give injections of camphor to relieve a sufferer, to keep his mind clear, to allow him to see his dear ones or the priest, or to encourage those about him. If, on the contrary, such injections make the patient irascible, and if his affairs have been settled, they should not be given to him, any more than under other circumstances where there would be good reason to think that he might act badly, in consequence.
It is evident that nurses would do much better at times to allow patients to die in peace, instead of holding them indefinitely in a state of intense nervous impatience and discouragement, because they are longing to die and they are not allowed to do so.
The opinion of La Rochelle-Fink agrees with that of E. Forgue and Payen. 26 Pediatricians are often concerned about their duties towards infants with serious congenital defects. In one of Fr. McFadden's discussion problems the doctor expresses the view that it is not necessary to place a monstrosity in a heating bassinet; but Fr. McFadden points out that this is an ordinary means of sustaining infant life and that its use is obligatory even in the case of monstrosities.
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Another of Fr. McFadden's problems concerns a baby born without an esophagus. 28 Would it be obligatory, in case the parents are wealthy, to have an esophagus made by artificial means? Fr. McFadden finds cumulative reasons for answering this precise question in the negative. First, it would be difficult to obtain a surgeon capable of performing the operation. Secondly, it would be equally difficult to get another esophagus to serve as a transplant. Thirdly, the disease itself (congenital atresia) would very likely be accompanied by other congenital defects which would render the possibility of preserving life very doubtful, even if this one operation were successfully performed.
It is interesting to note that, after having decided that it is not necessary to attempt to make the artificial esophagus, Fr. McFadden suggests that a gastrostomy would "appear to be an ordinary and proper method of attempting to save the life of the infant." It is not clear whether he means that the gastrostomy would be obligatory.
In my notes I have one quotation from an unknown source concerning the use of the iron lung merely to prolong the life of a hopelessly paralyzed invalid. "The patient," says this author, "has no obligation to submit to the prolongation of his life in so extraordinarily difficult a 27 See Medical Ethics, p. 141; and Reference Manual, pp. 25-26. I might mention here that a friend of mine recently asked authorities of eleven hospitals whether they considered oxygen tents, blood transfusions, and subcutaneous feeding to be ordinary or extraordinary means of preserving the life of a newly-born monstrosity. Eight of the eleven considered oxygen and subcutaneous feeding to be ordinary; six listed blood transfusions as ordinary. One reason for the difference concerning blood transfusions seems to be the great difficulty of finding veins in a newly-born infant that are suitable for transfusion. One wonders whether these authorities would give the same replies had the question concerned mentally normal infants. Should not the determination of ordinary and extraordinary begin with the mentally normal?
I have some slight information concerning prices that may be of interest. In one Midwestern city oxygen tents rent for $18 the first day, $15 the second day, and $14.50 for additional days. At one hospital in that city oxygen (by mask) is 30 cents an hour. At another hospital, there is a $10 charge for a blood transfusion, and the blood must be replaced. If the blood is not replaced by a donor there is an additional cost to the patient of $25 for a professional donor. The cost of intravenous feeding varies according to strength and amount. A nurse estimated that an adult patient living entirely on a 10 per cent glucose solution would have to pay "a few" dollars a day. No doubt these figures vary, but they indicate that the use of these things over a long period of time can be very expensive.
28 Medical Ethics, p. 141; Reference Manual, p. 26.
state; hence, the doctors, nurses, etc., have no obligation to use the apparatus in the circumstances, for their obligation is no greater than that of the patient." As will appear later, my main reason for quoting these words is that they assert that the duties of patient and medical profession are coextensive. Despite the frequent use of blood transfusions in modern medicine, I have found only one brief treatment of the duty of using them. According to La Rochelle-Fink, it is sometimes said that blood transfusions are extraordinary means. Their own inclination is to class them as ordinary, at least to the extent that they must sometimes be given, "if there are not too many grave dangers for the donors of the blood and if the treatment brings about a greater benefit at the time." To confirm their opinion they refer to two priests whose useful lives were saved by transfusions.
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' DISCUSSION
The preceding survey provokes many questions. The purpose of the present section is to call attention to some of the main problems and to suggest tentative solutions.
In the first section of the survey I referred to the opinion of some authors to the effect that an individual is not obliged to use any remedy unless it offers a reasonable hope of checking or curing a disease. On both intrinsic and extrinsic grounds this seems to be a sound working principle. But its application to the use of artificial measures gives rise to many questions. For instance, one might ask: may all artificial means be considered as remedies; or must they be distinguished into those which are intended as cures for disease (e.g., medicines, operations, etc.) and those which are primarily designed to supplant a natural means of sustaining life (e.g., intravenous feeding). There might be room for the distinction if we were discussing this question on a merely speculative basis. But the main purpose of this study is to arrive at a prudent, human evaluation of the factors involved; and on this basis all artificial means of sustaining life seem to be remedies. All of them are used because of some diseased or defective condition. I suggest, therefore, that any principle which is applicable to remedies as such is applicable to the use of any artificial means of preserving life.
The principle just cited refers even to the use of remedies which are normally considered ordinary means; a sick man is excused from using them if they do not offer a reasonable hope of success. Yet isn't it true that in interpreting this excusing cause many relative factors have to be weighed? There are degrees of "success." It is one thing to use oxygen to bring a person through a crisis; it is another thing to use it merely to prolong life when hope of recovery is practically negligible. There are also degrees of "hope," even when it concerns complete recovery. For example, in one case the use of oxygen to bring a patient through a pneumonia crisis may offer very high hope, whereas in another case the physical condition of the patient may be such that there is only a slim chance of bringing him through the crisis. Finally, there are degrees of difficulty in obtaining and using ordinary means. Some are inexpensive and very easy to obtain and use; others may involve much more difficulty, though not a moral impossibility.
I would not attempt to cite examples of all the variable combinations of factors that call for evaluation when we are deciding whether there is a "reasonable hope of success." But some examples may help to make the matter concrete. Take the case of using oxygen to tide a patient over a pneumonia crisis. The oxygen is easy to get and easy to use and-when used for only a short period, as would be the case here-it is relatively inexpensive. And if the patient survives the crisis he will be on the road to complete recovery. I would say that under these conditions the patient is obliged to use the oxygen if there is any solid hope of getting through the crisis. If the oxygen were more expensive or more difficult to obtain or use, a proportionate increase of hope of recovery would be required as a basis for obligation. In giving this solution I am following an analogy with the recognized principle that an extraordinary means is not per se obligatory even when success would be certain. It seems to follow from this that the more closely the ordinary means approximate the extraordinary the more readily they admit of excuse. Hence, a remedy which includes rather great difficulty, though not moral impossibility, is hardly obligatory unless the hope of success is more probable, whereas a remedy which is easily obtained and used seems obligatory as long as it offers any solid probability of success. I believe this is a sound interpretation of the expression "reasonable hope of success."
As a second example we can consider the use of insulin for diabetes. The insulin does not cure the disease, but it does check it to the extent that the patient can lead a normal life. Moreover, the insulin is not expensive; and, though its continued use is inconvenient, it would hardly approach a moral impossibility except in very unusual cases. This seems to be a clear case of a reasonable hope of success: a combination of slight difficulty plus high probability, if not moral certainty, of checking the disease indefinitely.
Finally, there is the use of oxygen or intravenous feeding merely to sustain life in the so-called "hopeless" cases. If, in the circumstances, these things can be called remedies, it is only in the very wide sense that they delay the hour of death. It is true that they will sustain life, and in that sense they offer a hope of success; and it is also true that their use for a short time is not very expensive. Yet the daily increasing expense can become significant. Because of all these factors it is difficult to see how they remain ordinary means or, if ordinary, how they really offer a reasonable hope of success. In terms of the patient's duties, therefore, I should say there is no obligation of using these things unless they are needed for some special reason, e.g., to allow time for the reception of the sacraments. (The duty in this case would be per accidens.) When Fr. McCarthy discussed the duty of using insulin it was with reference to a patient who had both diabetes and cancer. His solution was that the patient must use the insulin because it is an ordinary means of checking diabetes. I agree with him that insulin is an ordinary means, and I agree also that, merely as regards the diabetes, it must be used. But this problem provokes another question: namely, is a person who suffers from two lethal diseases obliged to take ordinary means of checking one of them when there is no hope of checking the other? In other words, granted the presence of the incurable cancer, can the insulin still be said to offer a reasonable hope of success? Must we consider the diseases separately, or should we consider the patient's total condition? I see no perfectly clear answer to these questions. I still favor Fr. McCarthy's solution to the effect that the insulin must be used; but I no longer consider this solution as certain because I am not sure we are justified in stating that the patient must prescind from the cancer in determining her obligation of using the insulin. It is true that this precision must be made in order to estimate whether insulin is an ordinary means of treating diabetes. But the duty to use the insulin involves two factors: it must be an ordinary means, and it must offer a reasonable hope of success. The presence of the cancer throws some doubt on the second factor. And I think the doubt would be even stronger were there some connection between the two diseases, for example, because both would be complications of the same basic disease.
Thus far I have followed the example of the standard moralists and limited my own statements to the duties of the individual. We can hardly stop with that. We must also consider the duties of relatives and of physicians. (Under physicians, I include all members of the medical profession, such as nurses and hospital authorities.) To avoid unnecessarily involved conditions, I shall limit my discussion only to cases of justice or quasi-justice. For relatives, this means that they are either administering the finances of the patient or carrying out a duty which is one of piety in the strict sense, and not solely of charity. For physicians, it means that they are dealing with a paying patient. The demands of charity can be solved for the most part, I think, according to the general principles concerning beneficence towards one's neighbor.
It is sometimes said that, with reference to the use of artificial means of preserving life, the duties of patients, relatives, and physicians are coextensive. It is easy to show that this statement is inaccurate. The patient is per se obliged to use only those means which are ordinary and which offer a reasonable hope of success. But he may use other means and if he reasonably wishes to use them the relatives and physicians are strictly obliged to carry out his wish. This indicates one important difference between the duties of the patient on the one hand, and those of the relatives and physicians on the other.
As for the physicians, there may be another, and perhaps more important, difference. I have spoken of this matter occasionally with very conscientious physicians, and I have found that they consistently express a professional ideal to the effect that they must use all means in their power to sustain life, and that they must use any remedy which offers any hope, even a slight hope, of cure or relief. It is true that at times this professional ideal seems to work an unnecessary hardship on dying patients and their relatives; yet there is much to be said in its favor. By working on even the smallest hope doctors often produce wonderful results, whereas a defeatist attitude would in a certain sense "turn back the clock" of medical progress. Also, this professional ideal is a sure preventive of a euthanasian mentality.
I do not know how common this professional ideal is. But from my own experience with physicians and from many recent statements of the medical profession against euthanasia I would conclude that it is very common among conscientious physicians. Nor can I say to what extent this professional standard creates an obligation; but I think the common good would demand at least this minimum: the preservation of the ideal is obligatory insofar as it is necessary to prevent a euthanasian mentality. This can hardly mean that his professional standards oblige a physician to prescribe things he knows to be useless; but it may mean that he* must prescribe many things which a non-medical man might look on as practically useless.
One final point before concluding this section. As a prelude to his solution of the insulin case, Fr. McCarthy stated that a patient may not discontinue the use of extraordinary means with the intention of shortening life as the immediate object of the act. Would all moralists agree with this? Since extraordinary means are not obligatory for the patient, and since the desire for death can be licit, I do not see why extraordinary means may not be omitted precisely because of a legitimate desire for death. "Id relinquo doctis definiendum."
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PRACTICAL CASES
I trust that the survey and discussion have covered the main points that call for consideration in estimating the duty of using artificial means to prolong life. It is hardly necessary to attempt to recapitulate all these points here; but it may be helpful to review some of them with reference to a few practical cases.
In my discussion I mentioned the case of the pneumonia crisis. With the help of oxygen and other available remedies the patient can very likely be brought through the crisis and put on the road to complete recovery. This seems to be a clear case in which patient, relatives, and physician are all obliged to use the means indicated; for, though artificial, they involve no moral impossibility and they offer a reasonable hope of success.
A very different situation is portrayed in Fr. McFadden's problem concerning the use of a stimulant merely to prolong life a short time. His solution is that, under the circumstances (inevitable death in a short time, great pain, patient prepared for death), the use of the stimulant may be considered an extraordinary means and not obligatory. I agree that it is not obligatory, but my analysis of the case would be somewhat different. I should prefer to say that the use of a stimulant for such a short time is an ordinary means. But since it is artificial, and since it has practically no remedial value in the circumstances, the patient is not obliged to use it. {Nemo ad inutile tenetur, or parum pro nihilo reputatur.) Moreover, granted the conditions of the problem, the patient would hardly want it; hence the relatives may licitly request that it should not be used.
If this case were changed slightly and it were asked whether the physician is obliged to prescribe the stimulant, I should say that he need not do so unless his professional standards require it. It is hardly conceivable that a reasonable professional standard would call for it in the circumstances. An admirable standard seems to be the rule formulated by La Rochelle-Fink: the doctor should do what seems to be productive of the greater good.
Frs. Donovan and Sullivan present another practical problem: a patient is dying, but his life can be prolonged for several weeks by intravenous feeding. Both authors apparently consider the case of a conscious patient. Fr. Donovan believes the intravenous feeding is an ordinary means, and obligatory; Fr. Sullivan is of the opinion that the circumstances of his case make it extraordinary, and not obligatory. I agree with Fr. Donovan that intravenous feeding is in itself an ordinary means. But even granted that it is ordinary, one may not immediately conclude that it is obligatory. Man> factors must be weighed; and neither writer seems to have considered them aU.
There is, for instance, the question of the utility of this means. To me, the mere prolonging of life in the given circumstances seems to be relatively useless, and I see no sound reason for saying that the patient is obliged to submit to it. But does the patient want it? Theoretically, if he is conscious and calm he should be allowed to answer this question for himself; practically, I would not ask him the question, but I would presume that he wants it unless he protests against it. If he is conscious, but constantly racked with pain to the extent that he is not spiritually profiting by it, relatives and physicians may reasonably presume that he does not wish the intravenous feeding. Granted this presumption, the relatives may licitly ask that the artificial feeding be discontinued and the physician may accede to this request or even take the initiative unless his professional standards dictate otherwise.
I think that on purely speculative grounds the analysis just given is valid. Yet I frankly hesitate to give a practical answer (as Fr. Sullivan seems to do) allowing the physician to discontinue the intravenous feeding as a means of putting an end to the suffering. I fear that the abrupt ceasing to nourish a conscious patient might appear to be a sort of "Catholic euthanasia" to many who cannot appreciate the fine distinction between omitting an ordinary means and omitting a useless ordinary means. Moreover, doctors are discovering new methods of dealing with pain; and the use of one of these methods might be more in keeping with their professional ideal. It is hardly just to press this ideal to the point of imposing intolerable burdens on patients or relatives; yet the common good calls for great prudence whenever the preservation of the ideal is involved. Before giving a practical answer for a definite case, I should want to discuss points like these, not only in general, but also with reference to the circumstances of the case.
A variation of the preceding case, not explicitly discussed by Fr. Donovan or Fr. Sullivan, concerns the patient in coma. This is probably a more practical aspect of the case. I am often asked whether such things as oxygen and intravenous feeding must be used to pro-long the life of a patient, already well prepared for death, and now in a terminal coma. In my opinion, the circumstances of this case make it obvious that the non-use of artificial life-sustainers is not the same as mercy killing; and I see no reason why even the most delicate professional standard should call for their use. In fact, it seems to me that, apart from very special circumstances, the artificial means not only need not but should not be used, once the coma is reasonably diagnosed as terminal. Their use creates expense and nervous strain without conferring any real benefit. It must be kept in mind, however, that it is for the physician to decide when the coma is terminal.
CONCLUSION
Many points mentioned in the preceding pages call for; discussion. Among them all, however, these two seem to be of special import:
(1) the opinion that even ordinary artificial means are not obligatory when relatively useless; and (2) the suggestion that the physician's professional ideal may create obligations that extend beyond the duties and wishes of his patient.
